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CASENOTES
UNITED STATES V. NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES
UNION AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HONO-
RARIA BAN: PROTECTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
"Congress shall make no law... [a]bridging the freedom of
speech."'
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1980s, government ethics were brought into the
spotlight as the public's confidence in the integrity of govern-
ment officials eroded.2 In an attempt to curb actual and per-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The focus of such ethical concerns was on the HUD scandal, the congressional
speech honoraria, and the individual scandals of certain members of the House and
Senate. Mark A. Adams et al., Project, Eighth Survey of White Collar Crime Substan-
tive Crime: Ethics in Government, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 617, 617-18 (1993). "Accord-
ing to a recent Washington Post-ABC poll, nearly 6 out of 10 people questioned be-
lieve the ethics of members of Congress were poor .... Huang Yong, Wright, Victim
of Money-Hunting, Partisan Hostility, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Service, June 1,
1989.
"Reforms in rules governing honoraria also gained support as a result of rev-
elations about honoraria abuses by former House Speaker Jim Wright." Thomas C.
Joerg, Viewpoint, Thoughts on the Thought Police, NAT'L J. GoV'T EXECUTIVE, Feb.
1991. It was believed that Jim Wright had been violating ethics rules for at least ten
years before his resignation. Allegations of Wright's ethical violations included the
following: (1) failure to financially disclose $145,000 worth of gifts received in the
form of salary to his wife, and free or cut-rate use of apartments and a car; (2) sur-
passing the congressional limits on honoraria by selling bulk quantities of his book to
groups to which he had delivered speeches; and (3) improperly receiving $145,000
worth of gifts from one individual (George Mallick), thereby violating the house rules
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ceived improprieties by government employees, and to reinforce
the standards of integrity within the federal government, Pres-
ident Bush signed into law the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.'
Prior to the enactment of the Reform Act, the Quadrennial
Commission had recommended to Congress both a thirty-five
percent salary increase and a ban on honoraria received in all
three branches of the government.4 The Quadrennial Commis-
sion, first appointed by Congress in 1967, functions to recom-
mend appropriate salary levels for the top executive, legislative,
and judicial positions.5 The Commission's 1989 report, which
reinstated previous recommendations of significant salary in-
creases, proved to be instrumental in channeling the enactment
of the Reform Act of 1989.6 The President's Commission on
Federal Ethics Law Reform endorsed the recommendation to
ban the receipt of honoraria by all officials and employees in all
three branches of government.7
limiting the receipt to gifts valued under $100. Huang Yong, U.S. House Speaker
Accused of Violating Ethical Rules, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Service, April 17,
1989.
3. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 [hereinafter
Reform Act] (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505 (1994)) (amending the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978). The Reform Act serves two principal purposes:
"(1) to make necessary ethics reforms, including reforms of the outside income, gift,
and travel rules, and (2) to institute a pay raise for officials and employees of all
branches." June E. Edmondson, And Gifts and Travel for All, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J.
402, 402 (1990). Furthermore, the Reform Act expanded the existing restrictions upon
off-the-payroll money-making activities of current federal employees in all three
branches of the U.S. government. National Treasury Employees Union v. United
States, 788 F. Supp. 4, 5 (D.D.C. 1992).
4. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1009
(1995). The Reform Act adopted the Commission's recommendations; however, it only
provided a twenty-five percent salary increase to employees at and above the GS-16
salary level. Id. The provisions governing this increase may be found in section 703
of the Reform Act.
5. Id. at 1008.
6. Id. at 1008-09.
7. Id. at 1009. The President's Commission stated:
Although we are aware of no special problems associated with receipt of
honoraria within the judiciary, the Commission-in the interest of allevi-
ating abuses in the legislative branch and in applying equitable limita-
tions across the government-joins the Quadrennial Commission in recom-
mending the enactment of legislation to ban the receipt of honoraria by
all officials and employees in all three branches of government.
Id. at 1028. "In recommending this ban, we also recognize, as did the Quadrennial
Commission, that the statutory definition of honoraria must be broad enough to 'close
present and potential loopholes. . . .'" Id. at 1009.
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Just eleven years earlier, Congress had passed the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978.8 This Act was passed in response to
the public's growing concern with the integrity of the United
States government that resiilted largely from the Watergate
scandal of the 1970s.' The stated purpose of the 1978 Act was
to "preserve and promote the accountability and integrity of
public officials and of the institutions of the Federal Govern-
ment" and to require investigations by the Attorney General in
certain situations, particularly where the alleged wrongdoings
involved the executive department. ° Upon signing the 1978
Act into law, President Carter described it as that which "will
not only make [government officials] honest but [that which]
will keep them honest" and that which will ensure that "the
public has available to them an assessment of whether or not
that candidate or that public official is honest."1
The Reform Act amended the 1978 Act to impose a complete
ban on the receipt of honoraria 2 by federal government em-
ployees. 3 By implementing the salary increase, members of
8. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.
[hereinafter 1978 Act].
9. The 1978 Act was "a direct outgrowth of the Watergate scandals" and "the
failure of the then-Attorney General to prosecute those responsible for the 'cover-up'
of the initial burglary." Stuart Taylor, Jr., U.S. Judge Orders A Special Inquiry Into
'80 Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1984, at Al (quoting United States District Judge
Harold H. Greene); see also Adams et al., supra note 2, at 617 (discussing the effect
of the Watergate scandal).
10. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4217.
11. Adams et al., supra note 2, at 617.
12. The provisions of the Reform Act governing honoraria are codified at 5 U.S.C.
app. §§ 501-505 (1994), which reads:
The term "honorarium" means a payment of money or anything of value
for an appearance, speech or article (including a series of appearances,
speeches, or articles if the subject matter is directly related to the
individual's official duties or the payment is made because of the
individual's status with the Government) by a Member, officer or em-
ployee, excluding any actual and necessary travel expenses incurred by
such individual (and one relative) to the extent that such expenses are
paid or reimbursed by any other person, and the amount otherwise deter-
mined shall be reduced by the amount of any such expenses to the ex-
tent that such expenses are not paid or reimbursed.
5 U.S.C. app. § 505(3) (1994).
13. 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b). On February 2, 1989, Congress passed the prohibition
of honoraria "by Members, officers or employees of the Senate on or after the first
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government would no longer find it necessary to accept honorar-
ia in order to supplement their salaries.'4 Government employ-
ee organizations such as the National Treasury Employees
Union ("NTEU") denounced the amended regulations as bizarre
and illegal. 5 NTEU's president, Robert Tobias, characterized
the amendment as "an absurd move that underscored our con-
tention that the general ban on federal employee honoraria is
ridiculous." 6 The president of the American Federation of Gov-
ernment Employees, John N. Sturdivant, believed that "Con-
gress made an inadvertent error by subjecting all federal work-
ers to the restrictions, when its real purpose was 'to clean up
its own house.""' 7 Moreover, there still existed the ever-present
level of dissatisfaction among federal employees who did not
earn as high a salary as those in Congress."
day that there takes effect any increase in the salaries of Members officers, or em-
ployees of the Senate as recommended by the Commission on Executive, Legislative,
and Judicial Salaries. . . ." S. Res. 40, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 135 CONG. REC. 1014
(1989) "The honoraria ban for all federal employees was a last-minute addition to the
[Reform] [A]ct. . . . House members and senior executive branch employees got hefty
pay raises . .. which also took effect Jan. 1, [and] are as high as 33% for some
employees." Dana Priest, Ethics Law's Deep Reach Into Bureaucracy; Honoraria Ban
Curtails Employees' Outside Work; Court Challenge Cites First Amendment, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 1991, at A19. Because Congress regarded the acceptance of honoraria
by its own members as a suspect activity, "as tending to corrupt," it sought to pro-
hibit the receipt of honoraria not only by its ow members, but also by virtually
anyone employed by the federal government. National Treasury Employees Union v.
United States, 788 F. Supp. 4, 5 (D.D.C. 1992).
14. "[The honoraria ban] was enacted based on recommendations of two govern-
ment commissions, which tied salary increases for members of Congress and top exec-
utive branch officials to elimination of honoraria." 64 U.S.L.W. 3062, 3062 (U.S. Aug.
1, 1995).
15. Executive Memo: Honoraria Debate Rages, 1992 NAT'L J. GOVT EXECUTIVE,
Mar. 31, 1992.
16. Id. Office of Government Ethics ("OGE") director, Stephen Potts, agreed with
Tobias, stating that "[wihile Congress made a policy decision in enacting the honorar-
ia ban now in effect, I continue to believe that a different policy would be more ad-
vantageous to government and less onerous to the many employees it now affects."
Id. Earlier, Potts had called the Honoraria Ban "too restrictive" and "a mistake."
Joerg, supra note 2.
17. Joerg, supra note 2. In 1991, the American Federation of Government Em-
ployees represented at least 700,000 federal workers. Id. Mr. Joerg contents that
By aiming at the freelancers and individualists in our society, Congress
seems to give the federal worker the message that the government does-
n't want any free-thinkers in its house, nor does it want to give people
the opportunity to enhance their income by thinking. This inclusion of all
federal employees . . . is particularly hypocritical. ...
Id.
18. Lt. Steven L. Hein of the U.S. Coast Guard wrote in a letter: "The restric-
NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
The Honoraria Ban forbids federal employees from accepting
compensation for making speeches or writing articles, and "ap-
plies even when neither the subject of the speech or the article
nor the person or group paying for it has any connection with
the employee's official duties." 9 This provision of the Reform
Act has been the subject of an ongoing constitutional battle
between the United States government and its employees. 0
However, in February, the Supreme Court struck down the
Honoraria Ban in National Treasury determining that it breach-
es the First Amendment rights of government employees.2' Al-
ready, the Court's decision has provided authority to cases
similarly involving government regulations which abridge public
employees' First Amendment rights.2
This casenote reviews the Court's decision in National Trea-
sury and examines the interpretative scheme utilized in arriv-
ing at its conclusion. Part II of this casenote familiarizes the
reader with the events and situations surrounding the National
Treasury case and compares the definition of "honorarium"
adopted by the Supreme Court in National Treasury with the
definition initially proposed by Congress under the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978. Part III examines how the majority in
National Treasury dealt with the "nexus" requirement as it
affects government impropriety. Part IV analyzes the manner in
which the Supreme Court applied the test in Pickering v. Board
of Education to address the constitutionality of the Honoraria
Ban. A summary of National Treasury's dissenting opinion
appears in Part V. Finally, this casenote concludes that the
tions of this act are too broad and will not only adversely affect individuals and
private organizations but the government as well. The issue here is not the mon-
ey. . . . If we allow the provisions of this act to go unchallenged, we are quietly
accepting what amounts to censorship." Honoraria Ban Offends, 1991 NATAL J. GOV'T
EXECUTIVE, Apr. 15, 1991.
Harry F. Noyes, HI, a Public Affairs Specialist for the U.S. Army Health Ser-
vices Command had this to offer: "Everyone is missing the point, as regards to the
honoraria ban. Congress' vicious and stupid act of legislative tyranny is indeed uncon-
stitutional. But we may not get far citing the First Amendment, since the law does
not forbid us to publish." Id.
19. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1008
(1995).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995) rev'g 984 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir.
1993); see also infra part VI.
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National Treasury decision projects authority and guidance to
other courts in matters involving public concern and restraint of
expression, demonstrates an evolution of the Pickering test, and
preserves the First Amendment right of the freedom of expres-
sion.
II. REACTION TO THE HONORARIA BAN: THE NATIONAL
TREASURY CASE
When the NTEU, the American Federation of Government
Employees, and the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit in
1991 against the U.S. government, they gave a voice of protest
to those federal employees who resented the Honoraria Ban.'
The suit charged that the Honoraria Ban infringed upon the
employees' First Amendment rights.24 The district court de-
clared that the Honoraria Ban was unconstitutional insofar as
it applied to executive branch employees.25 The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision and con-
cluded that the Honoraria Ban was not narrowly tailored to
achieve its purpose.26 The court reasoned that "[t]o create the
sort of impropriety or appearance of impropriety at which the
statute is evidently aimed, there would have to be some sort of
nexus between the employee's job and either the subject matter
of the expression or the character of the payor."27 The D.C.
Circuit found that the government had failed to identify such a
nexus as to many of the plaintiffs." Therefore, in order for
there to be a ban on honoraria received, a nexus must exist
23. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 788 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C.
1992).
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id. at 13.
26. National Treasury Employees v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1277, 1279
(D.C. Cir. 1993). The D.C. Circuit court also agreed with the district court's holding
that the Honoraria Ban was severable from the remainder of the Reform Act in its
application to executive branch employees. Id. at 1277-79.
27. Id. at 1275. See infra part III for further discussion of the "nexus" re-
quirement.
28. Id. The plaintiffs included a Nuclear Regulatory Commission lawyer who
wrote on Russian history, a postal service mailhandler who wrote and gave speeches
on the Quaker religion, a Department of Labor lawyer who lectured on Judaism, a
Department of Health and Human Services employee who reviewed art, and musical
and theater performances for local newspapers, and a civilian Navy electronics techni-
cian who wrote on Civil War ironclad vessel technology. Id. (citations omitted).
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between the speech and the employee's job.
In 1995, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed
the constitutionality of the Honoraria Ban in United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union." The Court held that the
prohibition imposed a significant burden on expressive activity
and that it was the kind of burden that abridges speech under
the First Amendment." The National Treasury case was a
consolidation of several cases that challenged the ability of Con-
gress to impose a ban abridging the constitutional right to free
speech of government employees.3' The respondents included
individual members of, and a union representing a class com-
posed of all executive branch employees below grade GS-16
who, but for the Honoraria Ban, would be entitled to receive
honoraria."
The Supreme Court in National Treasury adopted the defini-
tion of "honorarium" as amended by the 1992 Legislative
Branch Appropriations Act33 to include a payment of money or
anything of value for an appearance, speech or article (includ-
ing a "series of appearances, speeches, or articles if the subject
matter is directly related to the individual's official duties or
the payment is made because of the individual's status with the
Government)." 4 In other words, the 1992 Appropriations Act
29. 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
30. Id. at 1018. Accord Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (holding that a statutory prohibition on compensation un-
questionably imposes a significant burden on expressive activity, and is therefore
inconsistent with the First Amendment). In Simon & Schuster, New York's "Son of
Sam" law required accused or convicted criminals who received income from works
describing their crimes to deposit the proceeds into an escrow account to be held and
distributed to the victims of the crime and to creditors. Id. at 504-05.
31. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1010.
32. Id. The General Schedule ("GS") is the basic pay schedule for federal govern-
ment employees. The schedule sets the annual rates of basic pay, consisting of 15
grades, designated "GS-1" through "GS-15", consecutively, with 10 rates of pay for
each such grade. 5 U.S.C. § 5332(a)(1)-(2) (1994). The General Schedule for the pay
period beginning January 1, 1995 indicates that the salary range for federal employ-
ees is between $12,141 (GS-1, step 1) through $88,326 (GS-15, step 10). Schedule 1, 5
U.S.C. § 5332 (1994).
33. Legislative Branch Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-90, tit. HI, §
314, 105 Stat 447 (emphasis added).
34. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1009-10 (emphasis added). The 1992 Appro-
priations Act made the honoraria rules apply to the Senate and its employees, and
also made minor changes to the gift and financial disclosure provisions of the Reform
Act. Adams et al. supra note 2, at 620. The inapplicability of the Honoraria Ban to
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amended "honorarium" to allow federal employees to receive
money for making a series of appearances, giving a series of
lectures or speeches, or writing a series of articles which are
not related to the employee's official duties or status. While this
exclusion provided a distinct and unique meaning to
"honorarium" and gave it a narrower definition than that ini-
tially proposed in the Reform Act,35 it is also important to rec-
ognize that the definition has several significant omissions:
"[A]ppearance" does not include "performances using an
artistic, athletic or other such skill or talent or primarily
for the purpose of demonstration or display; "speech" does
not include "recitation of scripted material, as for a live or
theatrical production," or the "conduct of worship services or
religious ceremonies;" and "article" does not include "works
of fiction, poetry, lyric, or script." 6
The Supreme Court found that the Honoraria Ban was too
broad in its scope and that it should be less stringently applied
to lower-level governmental employees. The Court determined
that:
Congress reasonably could assume that payments of hono-
raria to judges or high-ranking officials in the Executive
Branch might generate a similar appearance of improper
influence. Congress could not, however, reasonably extend
that assumption to all federal employees below Grade GS-
the Senate and its employees was perceived as a "major flaw" in the Reform Act. Id.
at 636. The 1992 Appropriations Act subjected its officers and employees to the Hono-
raria Ban, and therefore corrected this "major flaw." Id. For a complete definition of
"honorarium," see supra note 12.
35. The original definition set forth in the Reform Act read as follows:
The term "honorarium" means a payment of money or any thing of value
for an appearance, speech or article by a Member, officer or employee,
excluding any actual and necessary travel expenses incurred by such
individual (and one relative) to the extent that such expenses are paid or
reimbursed by any other person, and the mount otherwise determined
shall be reduced by the amount of any such expenses to the extent that
such expenses are not paid or reimbursed.
National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1009 n.4 (quoting 5 U.S.C. app. § 505(3) (Supp. I
1989).
36. Robert S. Collins, Ethics and the First Amendment: The Applicability of the
Honorarium Ban of the Ethic Reform Act of 1989 to the Executive Branch, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 888, 892 (1994) (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Unit-
ed States, 788 F. Supp. 4, 6 n.3 (D.D.C. 1992)).
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16, an immense class of workers with negligible power to
confer favors on those who might pay to hear them speak
or to read their articles.
37
Ultimately, the Court declared the Honoraria Ban unconstitu-
tional as it applied to those employees below the GS-16 level,
that is, to those employees who did not receive the twenty-five
percent salary increase when Congress passed the Reform
Act.3
8
Relying upon the narrowed definition of honorarium, the
Court proceeded to analyze its application to the relation be-
tween the federal employee's official duties and the employee's
expressive activity.39 The Court recognized that the language
of the Honoraria Ban did not clearly identify the terms of any
nexus requirement" between expressive activity and govern-
ment employment.4 The following statement issued by the
Court discloses the uncertainty surrounding the issue of when
the Honoraria Ban applies:
In other words, accepting pay for a series of articles is pro-
hibited if and only if a nexus exists between the author's
employment and either the subject matter of the expression
or the identity of the payor. For an individual article or
speech, in contrast, pay is taboo even if neither the subject
matter nor the payor bears any relationship at all to the
author's duties.42
37. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1016.
38. Id. at 1018-19.
39. Id. at 1016-17.
40. Likewise, the D.C. Circuit, in National Treasury Employees Union v. United
States, addressed the issue of the "nexus" requirement and concluded that the
government's failure to identify some sort of nexus between the employee's job and
either the expression's subject matter or the payor's character undercut its proffered
concern about actual or apparent improprieties in the receipt of honoraria. 990 F.2d
1271,1275-77 (D.C. Cir. 1993). "To create the sort of impropriety or appearance of
impropriety at which the statute is evidently aimed, there would have to be some
sort of nexus between the employee's job and either subject matter of the expression
or the character of the payor." Id. at 1275.
41. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1016-17.
42. Id. "Congress' decision to provide a total exemption for all unrelated series of
speeches undermines application of the ban to individual speeches and articles with
no nexus to Government employment." Id.
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Thus, the Court reaffirmed the notion that without the expres-
sion of such a nexus, it is unlikely that the sort of government
impropriety or appearance of impropriety at which the Honorar-
ia Ban is aimed would emerge.43
In addressing the constitutionality of the Honoraria Ban as
an abridgment of First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court
in National Treasury applied the balancing test set forth in
Pickering v. Board of Education.' This deferential test balanc-
es "the interest of the [public employee], as a citizen, in com-
menting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
service it performs through its employees."' The Court jus-
tified the application of the Pickering test to the respondents in
National Treasury because the expressive activities" subject to
the Honoraria Ban fell "within the protected category of citizen
comment on matters of public concern rather than employee
comment on matters related to personal status in the
workplace."47  Thus, the government in National Treasury
found itself bearing the heightened burden4" of justification for
43. Id. at 1017; see also National Treasury Employees Union v. United States,
990 F.2d 1271, 1275-76 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ('[I]t is clear that the ban reaches a lot of
compensation that has no nexus to government work that could give rise to the
slightest concern."). A further discussion of the nexus requirement appears infra Part
III.
44. 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that although the state could not condition pub-
lic employment upon a surrender of First Amendment rights enjoyed by citizens not
employed by the government, the state did have a stronger interest in regulating the
speech of its employees than it had in regulating the speech of citizens generally).
45. Id. at 568. The Pickering Court applied this test and ruled that the teacher
could not be fired for having written a letter to the local newspaper criticizing the
school board's allocation of funds. Id. at 574-75- See infra part IV for a more detailed
discussion of the Pickering test.
46. The expressive activities refer to the speeches and articles for which respon-
dents received compensation before enactment of the Reform Act.
47. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013. In cases where disciplinary actions are
taken in response to a government employee's speech, the Court has applied the
Pickering test only when the employee has spoken "as a citizen upon matters of pub-
lic concern" rather than "as an employee upon matters only of personal interest."
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). There is a "longstanding recognition that
the First Amendment's primary aim is the full protection of speech upon issues of
public concern." Id. at 154 (emphasis added); see also Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct.
1878 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Baird v. Cutler, 883 F. Supp. 591 (D. Utah 1995).
48. When speech involves a matter of public concern, the government bears the
burden of justifying its adverse employment action. Id.; Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388; cf
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regulating the expressive activity of its employees because the
"sweep" of the Honoraria Ban "singles out expressive activity for
special regulation."49 As the government failed to meet its bur-
den,5" the Court determined that the Honoraria Ban violated
the First Amendment."'
III. GOVERNMENT IMPROPRIETIES AND THE "INEXUS"
REQUIREMENTS
The enactment of both the 1978 Act and the Reform Act
occurred largely in response to the public's perception of the
government's integrity.52 Specifically, the Honoraria Ban re-
flected Congress' effort to protect and preserve the government's
interest by assuring that federal employees did "not misuse or
appear to misuse power" by accepting compensation for their
expressive activities.53 When the President's Commission of
Federal Ethics Law Reform endorsed the views of the Quadren-
nial Commission,5 " it proposed that the definition of "honorar-
Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-49 (stating that private speech involving nothing more than
a complaint about a change in the employee's own duties may give rise to discipline
without imposing any special burden of justification of the government employer).
49. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1017 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Hon-
oraria Ban is based only on speculation that the expressive activity might promote
government impropriety and threaten the government's interests. The Court points
out that "a 'reasonable' burden on expression requires a justification far stronger than
mere speculation about serious harms." Id. at 1017. Part IV of this casenote includes
a detailed analysis of the "heightened" burden requirement imposed on the United
States government.
50. In order to meet its burden of justification for the restriction on expression
created by the Honoraria Ban, the government was required to show that "the inter-
ests of both potential audiences and vast group of present and future employees in a
broad range of present and future expression are outweighed by that expression's
'necessary impact on the actual operation' of the Government." Id. at 1014 (citing
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 517).
51. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1018 ("[T]he speculative benefits the honorar-
ia ban may provide the Government are not sufficient to justify this crudely crafted
burden on respondents' freedom to engage in expressive activities.").
52. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
53. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1015.
54. The Quadrennial Commission, first appointed by Congress in 1967, functions
to recommend appropriate levels of Executive, Legislative, and Judicial salaries. In
1989, the Quadrennial Commission reinstated previous recommendations of significant
salary increases; its report proved to be instrumental in channeling the enactment of
the Reform Act of 1989. The Commission recommended a 35% salary increase as well
as a ban on honoraria received. Id. at 1008-09. As we know now, the Reform Act
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ia" had to be broad enough to "close present and potential loop-
holes .. .not reasonably necessary for the appearance involved;
or any other benefit that is the substantial equivalent of an
honorarium."55 Clearly, Congress formulated a link between
the actual and perceived improprieties by federal employees and
their expressive activities and concluded that its interests
would be best served by applying an across-the-board ban so
that federal employees could not escape the statute through
loopholes.
Part II of this casenote identified the definition of honorari-
um adopted by the Supreme Court in National Treasury.0 On
its face, the language provided by this definition applies the
Honoraria Ban to nearly all federal employees." However, the
Court moved beyond this interpretation and determined that
the language also provided an exemption for a series of speech-
es, appearances and articles unrelated to federal employ-
ment. 8 In other words, a series of expressive activities is not
prohibited so long as it is not related to the federal employee's
duty or status. This determination is consistent with the ratio-
nale that unrelated expressive activities do not fall within the
link or "nexus" formulated by Congress.
The Court also recognized that an individual's speech is pro-
hibited, even if the content of the speech is unrelated to the
employee's government position.59 This feature of the Honorar-
ia Ban cast doubt on the government's argument that Congress
perceived honoraria as so threatening to the efficiency of the
entire federal service as to render the ban a reasonable re-
sponse to the threat." The fact that the 1992 Appropriations
Act amended the definition of "honorarium" to exclude a series
of speeches belies the need for such a ban on speeches or arti-
provided a 25% increase to certain governmental employees. The provisions governing
this increase may be found in Section 703 of the Reform Act. Id. at 1009 (citations
omitted).
55. Id. at 1009 (quoting To Serve with Honor: Report of the President's Commis-
sion on Federal Ethics Law Reform 36 (Mar. 1989)).
56. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
57. Baird v. Cutler, 883 F. Supp. 591, 598 n.3 (D. Utah 1995).
58. See National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1016. See supra part II.
59. 115 S. Ct. at 1016-17.
60. Id. at 1016-18.
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cles with no "nexus" to an employee's duties.6' Without such a
nexus, the appearance of impropriety is unlikely to appear.
Although each court reviewing the National Treasury case
recognized that the Honoraria Ban lacked a proper nexus test,
no attempt was ever made to remedy the defect. The constitu-
tionality of the Honoraria Ban was first addressed by the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia which applied the test
in which, despite a compelling state interest, statutory provi-
sions that are not "narrowly tailored" 2 enough to avoid signifi-
cant financial burdens on free speech rights are constitutionally
suspect.63 The district court found that the Honoraria Ban was
not narrowly tailored by reason of its failure to require a nexus
between prohibited speech and an employee's position in the
government.' On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
again addressed the constitutionality issue and also concluded
that the Honoraria Ban contained no identifiable nexus.65 Ab-
sent such a nexus, the presumption of impropriety is unlikely
to occur or raise concern.6 6 Additionally, both the district and
circuit courts concluded that the Honoraria Ban was severable
from the remainder of the Reform Act insofar as it applied to
executive branch employees.6 7 The D.C. Circuit further ad-
61. Id. at 1016-17.
62. The Supreme Court, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, defined "narrow tailor-
ing" as being satisfied "so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial govern-
ment interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." 491 U.S.
781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 474 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
63. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 788 F. Supp. 4, 7
(D.D.C. 1992) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105 (1991)).
64. Id. at 10-11. The court stated that:
No official nexus or relationship between the officeholder and those for
whom he would speak or write is contemplated by the statute. Payments
for a 'speech" or an "article" are proscribed to federal employees even
when there is neither the possibility nor a perception that the office and
the payment are interdependent.
Id. at 10.
65. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1274
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing how as to many of the plaintiffs, there was no suggestion
that their expressive activities are related to their employment).
66. Id. at 1275; see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
67. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1277-79
(D.C. Cir. 1993); National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 788 F. Supp.
4, 11-14 (D.D.C. 1992). Severance occurs when an unconstitutional provision of a
statute is removed from the rest of the statute and involves a determination of
whether the remainder of the statute is valid. As the district and circuit courts in
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vanced its opinion by stating that the formulation of an appro-
priate nexus test was a legislative, not judicial, duty." As a
result of its reluctance to rewrite the Reform Act to include
language indicating a nexus requirement, the D.C. Circuit chose
to invalidate that section of the Honoraria Ban as it applied to
executive officers by severing it from the Reform Act.69
Likewise, the Supreme Court concluded that it was Congress'
task to draft a narrower statute, but disagreed with the D.C.
Circuit's severance of the Honoraria Ban from the Reform Act
insofar as it provided a remedy to those not parties in the
case.70 The Court wisely rejected the Government's suggestion
to modify the Honoraria Ban by crafting a nexus requirement.
As Justice Stevens properly stated:
We cannot be sure that our attempt to redraft the statute
to limit its coverage to cases involving an undesirable nexus
between the speaker's official duties and either the subject
matter of the speaker's expression or the identity of the
payor would correctly identify the nexus Congress would
have adopted in a more limited honoraria ban. We cannot
know whether Congress accurately reflected its sense of an
appropriate nexus in the terse, 33-word parenthetical state-
ment with which it exempted series of speeches and articles
from the definition .... The process of drawing a proper
nexus, even more than the defense of the statute's applica-
tion to senior employees, would likely raise independent
constitutional concerns whose adjudication is unnecessary to
decide this case. 1
Ultimately, the Court torpedoed the government's argument
that a prophylactic rule was needed because a nexus test would
be too difficult to administer.72
National Treasury proposed, the unconstitutional provision of the Honoraria Ban could
be severed from the 1978 Act, thereby leaving the remainder of the 1978 Act in ef-
fect. Alternatively, courts may also hold that the unconstitutional provision is not
severable and may choose to invalidate the statute in its entirety. For further discus-
sion of severability see John C. Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993).
68. 990 F.2d at 1277 ("Articulation of some appropriate nexus test would seem a
purely legislative act.").
69. Id. at 1277-79.
70. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1018-
19 (1995).
71. Id. at 1019 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 1017. The Court stated that: "The Government's only argument against
1568
NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
It followed that the absence of a nexus requirement in the
language of the Honoraria Ban placed the United States in a
position to defend its interest under a heightened level of judi-
cial scrutiny.
IV. THE PICKERING TEST
A. Pickering v. Board of Education 7
In 1961, Marvin L. Pickering was dismissed from his teach-
ing position at a public school for writing a letter to the editor
of a local newspaper criticizing a school board's handling of a
tax bond issue.'4 As a result, Pickering took action against the
school board, claiming that his letter was protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Illinois Supreme Court re-
jected Pickering's claim on the ground that, as a public school
teacher, he had waived his right to make statements concerning
the operations of the school "which in the absence of such posi-
tion he would have an undoubted right to engage in."7 5 the
court concluded that Pickering could constitutionally be dis-
missed from his teaching position. 6
The Supreme Court of the United States did not attempt to
clarify the Illinois court's position concerning the scope of pro-
tection entitled under the First Amendment." Instead, the
Court premised its opinion by stating "that teachers may consti-
tutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on
matters of public interest in connection with the operation of
a general nexus limitation is that a wholesale prophylactic rule is easier to en-
force.... A blanket burden on the speech of nearly 1.7 million federal employees
requires a much stronger justification than the Government's dubious claim of admin-
istrative convenience." Id. (citations omitted).
73. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
74. Id. at 564-66.
75. Id. at 567.
76. Id. at 568.
77. "It is not altogether clear whether the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment had no applicability to appellant's dismissal for writing the letter in
question or whether it determined that the particular statements made in the letter
were not entitled to First Amendment protection." Id. at 567.
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the public schools in which they work.., has been unequivo-
cally rejected ... ""
The court's analysis focused on the interests of Pickering as a
public citizen, distinguishing him from the public employee
entity which had served as a basis for judgment in the lower
courts. When balanced against "the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees,"" it does not appear that
these interests outweigh those of a public citizen commenting
on matters of public concern.0 Given these circumstances, the
Supreme Court subsequently found that the letter was constitu-
tionally protected because it was related to a matter of public
concern.
In balancing the interests of the state against the interests of
its employees, the Pickering Court clearly formulated a stan-
dard of review relating to public employees' freedom of expres-
sion.
B. A Balancing Approach
The Pickering test is the classic balancing approach taken to
evaluate First Amendment rights of public employees."' To be
protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern,
and the employee's interest in expressing herself on this matter
must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to
"'the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employ-
78. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 570-74. "[Tlhe interest of the school administration in limiting teachers'
opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its inter-
est in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public." Id. at
573 (emphasis added).
Pickering's letter criticized the school board's allocation of funds between the
athletic and educational programs, and the manner in which the board sought to
solicit additional funds from the district's taxpayers to support its plan. Id. at 569.
The Court deemed the content of this letter to be a matter of public concern. Id. at
569-70. But see id. at 570 n.3 (discussing situations that might warrant a different
consideration of whether public comment is a matter of public concern).
81. See Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Sanjour v. EPA, 984 F.2d
434 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Baird v. Cutler, 883 F. Supp. 591 (D. Utah 1995).
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ees."'82 Therefore, in determining whether a public employee's
speech merits constitutional protection, a court is likely to em-
ploy the Pickering test to strike a balance between the compet-
ing interests. When the Supreme Court formulated the
Pickering test, its main concern was to guard public employees
from the fear of retaliatory dismissal after publicly commenting
on matters of public concern.83 However, National Treasury
supports the proposition that a court may also rely on the
Pickering test when it is required to determine the validity of a
public employer's restraint on job-related speech.'
C. Application of the Pickering Test to the Honoraria Ban
The National Treasury Court applied the Pickering test to
unprecedented facts regarding First Amendment rights of public
employees and sought to strike a balance under the test to
determine whether the restraints imposed by the Honoraria
Ban warranted constitutional protection.
1. The "Public Concern" Element
Whether a public employee's speech is a matter of public
concern is the threshold issue in determining whether the
employee's activity is entitled to constitutional protection. The
Supreme Court in Connick v. Myers provided that when an
employee's speech can "be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,"
the speech is a matter of public concern.85 Relying on the
Connick Court's analysis of "public concern," the National Trea-
sury Court determined that the speech subject to the Honoraria
82. Connick, 461 U.S. at 142 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968)).
83. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
84. 115 S. Ct. at 1012.
85. 461 U.S. at 146. Alternatively, when a public employee speaks publicly on a
matter of his or her personal interest, the "public concern" element usually is absent
from the facts of a case, and therefore, the Pickering test in not applicable. In this
type of situation, the Court may not be the appropriate forum to examine the conse-
quences of an employer's action. Id. at 147.
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Ban passed the threshold afforded by the First Amendment to
judicially review the Government's action.86
The Court employed the Pickering test upon determining that
the respondents' expressive activities in National Treasury fell
within the protected category of "public concern" since their
"speeches and articles for which they previously received com-
pensation were addressed to a public audience, were made out-
side the workplace, and involved content largely unrelated to
their government employment."" This conclusion, however,
does not alone determine that the expressive activities are
protected by the First Amendment.88
2. The Government's Burden
The United States government found itself bearing the bur-
den of justifying the Honoraria Ban on legitimate grounds.89
When speech surpasses the threshold inquiry of "public con-
cern,"" the government bears the burden to justify its adverse
employment action.9
Up to this point, the Court's application of the Pickering test
in National Treasury is consistent with that of Pickering and
other cases evaluating the First Amendment rights of public
employees. However, upon allocating the burden of justification
for regulating the expressive activities of its employees to the
government, the National Treasury Court also indicated that
this burden was heavier than usual.2
By augmenting the government's burden, the National Trea-
sury Court advanced the application of the Pickering test to a
different level. To understand the reasoning behind this, it is
necessary to examine how the Supreme Court distinguished
National Treasury from Pickering and its progeny.93 Unlike
86. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
87. Id.
88. See infra part IV.C.3.
89. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
90. See supra Part IV.C.1.
91. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 150 (1983).
92. National Treasury 115 S. Ct. at 1013-15.
93. See id. at 1012-13.
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Pickering, National Treasury "'does not involve a post hoc anal-
ysis of one employee's speech and its impact on that employee's
public responsibilities,' but rather the constitutionality of an ex
ante rule, which is a 'wholesale deterrent to a broad category of
expression by a massive number of potential speakers."'94 In
other words, the expressive activity subject to the Honoraria
Ban does not serve as a basis for disciplining or discharging a
federal employee like that in Pickering and its progeny because
the expressions have not yet occurred. Furthermore, "t]he wide-
spread impact of the honoraria ban... gives rise to far more
serious concerns than could any single supervisory decision."9"
Finally, unlike the responsive adverse action taken in Pickering,
the Honoraria Ban "chills potential speech before it happens."96
As the Court stated, "[t]he honoraria ban as applied to respon-
dents burdens speech far more than our past applications of
Pickering because the ban deters an enormous quantity of
speech before it is uttered, based only on speculation that the
speech might threaten the Government's interests."9" For these
articulated reasons, the Court required the government to bear
94. Baird v. Cutler, 883 F. Supp. 591, 598 n.3 (D. Utah 1995) (quoting National
Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013). But see National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1020
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Rieliance on the ex an-
telex post distinction is not a substitute for the case-by-case application of
Pickering.").
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the government bore a heavier
burden of justification, however not by reason of the ex ante/ex post distinction of the
regulation expressive activity, but by reason of the "magnitude of intrusion on
employees' interests." Id. at 1020-021. O'Connor stated this view in response to the
government's argument that greater deference should be given to its predictions of
harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used
to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large." Id. at 1021 (quoting Wa-
ters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994)).
Before National Treasury, the Pickering test was most recently applied in Wa-
ters. Id. at 1020. O'Connor perceived National Treasury as one of those situations in
which "the government may have to make a substantial showing that the speech is,
in fact, likely to be disruptive before it may be punished." Id. at 1021 (quoting Wa-
ters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887).
95. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1014.
96. Id.; see also Baird, 883 F. Supp. at 598 ("Post hoc analysis of an employee's
actual speech, as in this case, involves a less stringent balance and consideration of
the impact on the employee's responsibilities than ex ante analysis, which brings into
play prior restraint on speech often involving a broad category of expression by nu-
merous potential speakers.").
97. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013 n.11.
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a heavier burden of justification with respect to the Honoraria
Ban than with respect to an isolated disciplinary action."
3. Balancing the Interests
In addition to resolving the "public concern" issue,99 the
Court must strike a balance between the interests of the public
employees and the interests of the government before determin-
ing whether the employees' expressive activities are protected
by the First Amendment.'
Although the Honoraria Ban is considered a content-neu-
tral1°' restriction on expression which does not prohibit speech
per se, the Court determined that it imposed a significant bur-
den on the respondents in National Treasury. By providing a
disincentive to engage in expressive activity, the Honoraria Ban
98. 115 S. Ct. at 1014.
99. See supra part IV.C.i.
100. Watters v. City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, 895 (3d Cir. 1995). In Watters,
the court held that a former police department employee's statements in a newspaper
article expressing concern over the lack of formal policies for the EAP (employment
assistance program) was speech on a matter of public concern, and that the state-
ments were protected speech as the department's interests did not outweigh those of
the employee. Watters may provide additional guidance for courts in cases where re-
straints imposed by a public employer on its employees' speech are constitutionally
suspect. The Court in Watters introduced a three-step process for analyzing a public
employee's claim of retaliation for engaging in protected activity: (1) the plaintiff must
show that the activity in question is constitutionally protected; (2) the plaintiff must
show that the protected activity was the substantial or motivating factor in the retal-
iatory act; and (3) the defendant may defeat the plaintiffs claim by demonstrating by
a preponderance of the evidence that the same action would have been taken even in
the absence of protected activity. Id. at 892.
101. "The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling consideration." Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citation omitted). Id. In Ward, the
Court determined that the municipal noise regulation designed to ensure that the
musical performances at the public band shell did not disturb surrounding residents
was a content-neutral regulation. Id. at 792-95; cf Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New
York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (holding that the Son of Sam
law was inconsistent with the First Amendment since the law "singles out income de-
rived from expressive activity for a [financial] burden the State places on no other in-
come, and it is directed only at works with a specified content"); Johnson v. Los
Angeles Fire Dep't., 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that the county fire
department's prohibition of sexually oriented magazines in the workplace was uncon-
stitutional and content-based, because it only banned magazines which were sexually
oriented).
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is constitutionally suspect. 2 Thus, the Court adhered to its
conclusion in Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims
Board "that the imposition of financial burdens may have a
direct effect on incentives to speak" and is, therefore, inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment.
10 3
The government cited United Public Workers v. Mitchell"°
in an attempt to meet its burden of justification by comparing
the Honoraria Ban to the Hatch Act.105 The government ex-
plained to the Court its two interests: (1) to promote the effi-
ciency of public service and to avoid the appearance of impro-
priety resulting from honoraria-related speeches and arti-
cles;..6 and (2) to prevent the widespread "cumulative effect"
of a practice which was perceived to interfere with government
integrity.10
7
a. The Hatch Act'0 8
The Hatch Act prohibits partisan political activity by all
classified federal employees. 109 Congress' fear of "the cumula-
tive effect on employee morale of political activity by all em-
ployees who could be induced to participate actively" influenced
the promulgation of the Hatch Act in 1940."0 Congress be-
lieved that the Act would combat the "demonstrated ill effects"
of government employees' partisan political activities."' In ef-
fect, the Hatch Act simultaneously serves to prevent the abuse
of political patronage from contaminating the public service and
to promote government neutrality and efficiency."
102. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1020 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
103. Id. (citing Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115).
104. 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding the prohibition of the Hatch Act on partisan
political activity by all classified federal employees).
105. 115 S. Ct. at 1015. For a further discussion of the Hatch Act, see id. at
1026-29 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1016.
108. Hatch (Political Activity) Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (codified in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
109. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1015.
110. Id.; United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947).
111. 115 S. Ct. at 1015.
112. Michael Bridges, Comment, Release The Gags: The Hatch Act and Current
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For the purpose of later comparing the Hatch Act with the
Honoraria Ban, this subpart identifies the pertinent provision of
the Act, Section 9(a). Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act made it
unlawful for an officer or employee in the executive branch of
the Federal Government, with certain exceptions, to take "any
part in political management or in political campaigns.""'
More importantly, Section 9(a) served as a basis for the chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the Hatch Act in Mitchell and
in United States Civil Service Commission v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers.""
b. United Public Workers v. Mitchell".
Mitchell embodied a constitutional challenge to the second
sentence of section 9(a)..6 of the Hatch Act. The appellants in
Mitchell charged in their complaint that Section 9 was "repug-
nant to the Constitution of the United States as a deprivation
of freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly" and there-
fore, a violation of their First Amendment rights."
Legislative Reform-Another Voice for Reform, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 237, 239 (1993).
For the historical background of the Hatch Act, see id. part I.A.
113. Hatch Act, ch. 410, § 9(a), 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §
7324(a) (1994)). Section 7324(a) states that:
(a) An employee may not engage in political activity-
(1) while the employee is on duty;
(2) in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties
by an individual employed or holding office in the Government of the
United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof;
(3) while wearing a uniform or official insignia identifying the office or
position of the employee; or
(4) using any vehicle owned or leased by the Government of the Unit-
ed States or any agency or instrumentality thereof.
5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1994).
114. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
115. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
116. When Mitchell was decided, the second sentence of section 9(a) read:
No officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Govern-
ment, or any agency or department thereof, except a part-time officer or
part-time employee without compensation or with nominal compensation
serving in connection with the existing war effort, other than in any
capacity relating to the procurement or manufacture of war material
shall take any active part in political management or in political cam-
paigns.
Hatch (Political Activity) Act, ch. 410, § 9(a), 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (emphasis added).
117. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 83 n.12. The appellants also relied upon the Fifth, Ninth
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Since none of the appellants, except for Appellant Poole, had
yet engaged in the prohibited activity, the Court determined
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and dis-
missed the appeal."' The Court determined, however, that
Poole's appeal was appropriate for judicial review."' Poole, a
ward executive committeeman of a political party, was termi-
nated from his employment by the Civil Service Commission
upon being charged with taking an "active part in political
management or in political campaigns."" ° Essentially, Poole
urged the Court to resolve the issue of whether a breach of the
Hatch Act could be made the basis for disciplinary action by
the Commission without violating his First Amendment
rights. 12 1
The Court grounded its analysis by first professing Congress'
authority under the Constitution to enact legislation to regulate
the political conduct of its employees.'2 In addition to consti-
tutional authority, the Court cited to the authority of its case
law and offered as an example, a case' in which it had up-
held an act prohibiting certain types of political activity by
office holders. In Ex parte Curtis, the Court deemed the con-
and Tenth Amendments to challenge the constitutionality of section 9(a); see id.
118. Id. at 84, 89. "For adjudication of constitutional issues 'concrete legal issues,
presented in actual cases, not abstractions,' are requisite." Id. at 89 (citations omit-
ted).
119. Id. at 91.
120. Id. at 94 (quoting section 9(a) of the Hatch Act). Poole had been politically
active on election day as a worker at the polls and a paymaster for the services of
other party workers. Id.
121. Id In other words, the Court had to determine the constitutional validity of
section 9(a) of the Hatch Act.
122. See id. at 96.
123. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). The Court upheld the right of Congress
to punish the infraction of an act forbidding employees who were not appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate from giving or receiving money for po-
litical purposes from or to other employees of the government. Id. at 375. More spe-
cifically, section 6 of the Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 287, provided:
[T]hat all executive officers or employ[ees] of the United States not ap-
pointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, are
prohibited from requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any other officer
or employ[eel of the government, any money or property or other thing of
value for political purposes; and who shall offend against the provisions
of this section, shall be at once discharged from the service of the United
States; and he shall also be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on
conviction thereof shall be fined. ...
Id. at 371.
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stitutional authority of Congress to regulate the political con-
duct of its employees as the decisive principle to upholding the
prohibitory act. The Court stated
The evident purpose of Congress in all this class of enact-
ments has been to promote efficiency and integrity in the
discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper disci-
pline in the public service. Clearly, such a purpose is within
the just scope of legislative power, and it is not easy to see
why the act now under consideration does not come fairly
within the legitimate means to such an end. 24
Therefore, the Court's analysis concluded that as long as an
"end" is achieved by legitimately advancing the government's
interest, Congress has the authority to enact legislation regulat-
ing the political activities of its employees.
The Mitchell Court extended its analysis to the substantive
provision of section 9(a) of the Hatch Act and determined that
the Act's purpose was similar to that of the statutes prohibiting
political contributions of money.'25 The similarity bridges at
the point where each prohibition directs itself to certain politi-
cal contributions-these contributions being those traditionally
frowned upon with great disapproval in the area of public ser-
vice. 26 Whereas the Act in Ex parte Curtis prohibited contri-
124. Id. at 373 (emphasis added). It appears that the Court was advancing the
Government's interests, and perhaps suggesting that some rational basis test applies
to such legislation.
125. Id. at 98; see supra text accompanying note 19. The Court also cited United
States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930) in its attempt to demonstrate the similarity
between the Hatch Act and other statutes. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 98. In Wurzbach, the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of a statute which prohibited members of Con-
gress from receiving contributions for whatever political purpose. 280 U.S. at 399. The
pertinent section of the statute at issue, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,
read:
It is unlawful for any Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resi-
dent Commissioner to Congress, or any candidate for, or individual elect-
ed as, Senator, Representative . . . or any officer or employee of the
United States . . . to directly or indirectly solicit, receive, or be in any
manner concerned in soliciting or receiving, any assessment, subscription,
or contribution for any political purpose whatever, from any other such
officer, employee, or person.
Id. at 398 (quoting Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, § 312, 43 Stat. 1053
(1925) (originally codified at 18 U.S.C. § 208) (repealed 1972)).
126. 330 U.S. at 99.
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butions of money, the Hatch Act prohibited contributions of
energy by government employees.17
In the Court's view, if the means employed by Congress to
adequately promote an efficient public service may be achieved
by prohibiting partisan political activity, then the prohibition
may withstand any rational basis test."s The Court also rec-
ognized that the Hatch Act did not restrict expressions involv-
ing matters of public concern; instead it restricted only "active
participation in political management and political cam-
paigns."' 9 Upon concluding that Congress had reasonably
achieved its goals through legitimate means by enacting the
Hatch Act to minimize the cumulative effect on employee mo-
rale stemming from partisan political activity and to maximize
the efficiency of public service, the Court upheld the constitu-
tional validity of the Hatch Act. 3'
c. United States Civil Service Commission v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers"'
More than twenty-five years after Mitchell, the Supreme
Court again addressed the constitutionality of section 9(a) of
the Hatch Act." 2 As in Mitchell, the Court upheld the consti-
tutional validity of section 9(a) and again concluded that "nei-
ther the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Con-
127. 330 U.S. at 98; see also United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930) (up-
holding a statute which prohibited members of Congress from receiving contributions
for whatever political purpose).
128. 330 U.S. at 99-104.
129. Id. at 100. "It is only partisan political activity that is interdicted.... Ex-
pressions, public or private, on public affairs, personalities and matters of public in-
terest, not an objective of party action, are unrestricted by law so long as the Gov-
ernment employee does not direct his activities toward party success." Id.
130. Id. at 101-04.
131. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
132. Id By 1973, the codification of section 9(a) of the Hatch Act could be found
in 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2). Section 7324(a) provided:
An employee in an Executive agency or an individual employed by
the government of the District of Columbia may not-
(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfer-
ing with or affecting the result of an election; or
(2) take an active part in political management or in political cam-
paigns.
Id. at 550.
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stitution invalidates" such a prohibition on partisan political
activity.
133
The Court abandoned the rational basis test employed in
Mitchell. Instead, the Court determined that the proper ap-
proach to evaluate the constitutional validity of the Hatch Act
was to employ the Pickering balancing test.a" Upon applying
this balancing approach to section 7324(a)(2)'s sweeping limi-
tation on partisan political activity, the Court decided that
Congress had adequately struck a balance between its interests
and that of its employees, so as to promote government efficien-
cy and integrity.'35 The Court summarized its conclusion, stat-
ing that: "[allthough Congress is free to strike a different bal-
ance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the balance it has
so far struck is sustainable by the obviously important interests
sought to be served by the limitation on partisan political activ-
ities now contained in the Hatch Act."3 '
Like its decision in Mitchell, the Court found congressional
authority to regulate partisan political activity. However, in
Letter Carriers, the Court chose to employ a new device-the
Pickering balancing test-to examine the constitutional validity
of Hatch Act. In doing so, the Court lowered the standard the
government must meet in enacting legislation to secure its
interests. Different as it may appear, the Court's hybrid ap-
proach still rendered the same decision, that section 7324(a)(2)
of the Hatch Act is constitutional and does not impair, in any
way, a public employee's First Amendment rights.'37
133. Id. at 556 ("We unhesitatingly reaffirm the Mitchell holding . . . An Act of
Congress going no farther would in our view unquestionably be valid.").
The challengers in Letter Carriers advanced their theory on the proposition that
the language of section 7324(a)(2) was vague and ambiguous so as to abridge their
First Amendment rights. Id. at 568. In reaffirming its decision in Mitchell, the Court
concluded that the language of the Hatch Act was neither unconstitutionally broad
nor fatally overbroad. Id. at 568, 580 rev'g 346 F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1972).
134. 413 U.S. at 564. The Mitchell Court had not had the Pickering test upon
which to rely.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 581.
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d. The Hatch Act and the Honoraria Ban: A Comparison
The government in National Treasury attempted to meet its
burden of justification by comparing the Honoraria Ban to the
Hatch Act.138 The governmental interests advanced to the
Court were: (1) to promote the efficiency of public service and
to avoid the appearance of impropriety resulting from honorar-
ia-related speeches and articles;39 and (2) to prevent the
widespread "cumulative effect" of a practice which was per-
ceived to interfere with government integrity.40 The govern-
ment sought to classify the Honoraria Ban as a regulation of
employees "reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with
the efficiency of the public service."' So long as these gov-
ernmental interests could be best obtained and achieved by
prohibiting honoraria, the government argued that the Hono-
raria Ban was constitutionally valid.'
The National Treasury Court attacked the government's argu-
ment by contrasting the effect of partisan political activity to
that of receiving honoraria. The Court stated that "[ujulike
partisan political activity, however, honoraria hardly appear to
threaten employees' morale or liberty."' Thus, the "demon-
strated ill effects" which Congress had intended to combat were
not the underlying concern of Congress when it enacted the
Honoraria Ban. Instead, the government's concern stemmed
from the "actual or apparent impropriety by legislators and
high-level executives, together with the purported administra-
tive costs of avoiding or detecting lower-level employees' viola-
tions of established policies."' The Court recognized that the
government's interest was "undeniably powerful"; however, it
was unsupported by evidence suggestive of honoraria-related
138. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1015
(1995).
139. Id. at 1020 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 1016.
141. Id. at 1015 (citing Mitchell 330 U.S. at 101).
142. 115 S. Ct. at 1015-16; cf. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 99 ("If in their judgment,
efficiency may be best obtained by prohibiting active participation by classified em-
ployees in politics as party officers or workers, we see no constitutional objection.").
143. 115 S. Ct. at 1015.
144. Id. at 1016.
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improprieties by federal employees of all government branch-
es. 4' The Court further stated that, although the Hatch Act
also affected hundreds of thousands of federal employees, it
actually protected the employees' rights in a manner which
preserved their freedom of expression.4 ' Quite different was
the Honoraria Ban which aimed at restricting employees' rights
to free expression.'47 The government offered as evidence in-
cidents of impropriety by members of Congress and attempted
to extend an assumption to all other branches of the govern-
ment that such improprieties would also occur upon acceptance
of honoraria for speeches and articles." Absent evidence of
these improprieties stemming from all government branches,
the Court determined that the government failed to show how
the Honoraria Ban served to protect its interests.' In other
words, the Court found that neither the government's proffered
reasons nor its asserted interests were sufficiently weighty to
justify abridgement of the respondents' First Amendment rights.
The Pickering test in this case struck a balance in favor of the
public employees.
V. NATIONAL TREASURY'S DISSENT
The dissent vehemently disagreed with the Court's applica-
tion of the Pickering test, and stated that a proper application
145. Id. at 1015-16.
146. Id. Protecting the employees' right to free expression eliminates the sense of
threat or coercion in the workplace to participate in political activity one way or
another. Id. at 1015.
147. Id. at 1016.
148. Id. at 1016 n.18.
149. Id. at 1015-16. The Court further elaborated:
Congress reasonably could assume that payments of honoraria to judges
or high-ranking officials in the Executive Branch might generate a simi-
lar appearance of improper influence. Congress could not, however, rea-
sonably extend that assumption to all federal employees below Grade GS-
16, an immense class of workers with negligible power to confer favors
on those who might pay to hear them speak or to read their articles. A
federal employee, [such as Poole in Mitchell], might impair efficiency and
morale by using political criteria to judge the performance of his or her
staff. But one can envision scant harm, or appearance of harm, resulting
from the same employee's accepting pay to lecture on the Quaker religion
or to write dance reviews.
Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).
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of the balancing test would conclude that the Honoraria Ban is
consistent with the First Amendment. 5 °  Like Justice
O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed to avoid the ex an-
telex post distinction altogether and focused his discussion on
the principles established in Pickering and Waters.
First, the dissent points out that the government's interests
as an employer in regulating expressive activity differs from
those it possesses in regulating the expressive activity of the
general public. 5' Quoting Waters v. Churchill, the dissent pro-
posed that the proper resolution in balancing the competing
interests of the government and of its employees should be
consistent with the following explanation:
The key to First Amendment analysis of government em-
ployment decisions, then, is this: The government's interest
in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possi-
ble is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when
it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as
employer. The government cannot restrict the speech of the
public at large just in the name of efficiency. But where the
government is employing someone for the very purpose of
effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be
appropriate.152
The dissent, therefore, regards the majority's decision to under-
state the Pickering test because not enough weight is given to
the government justifications for the Honoraria Ban. 5 '
Secondly, the dissent states that greater deference should be
given to the government's "predictions of harm used to justify
restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used
to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large." "M
In other words, the dissent feels that the majority overstepped
its bounds in applying the unconstitutionality of the Honoraria
Ban to all employees under the GS-16 level and therefore, im-
150. Id. at 1030 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1025; Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
152. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct.
1878, 1887 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
153. Id. at 1024 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1027 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1886
(plurality opinion)).
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posed an "unduly broad remedy."5 ' According to the dissent,
it was unnecessary to impose a heavier burden on the govern-
ment for justification of the Honoraria Ban because of these
two stated principles.
The dissent further elaborated on the content-neutrality char-
acteristic of the Honoraria Ban and re-emphasized that there
was no ban on speech, only on receipt of compensation.'56 Un-
like the "Son of Sam" law in Simon & Schuster,'57 the Hono-
raria Ban did not "impose[] a financial disincentive only on
speech of a particular content."' The content-based feature of
the "Son of Sam" law necessitated the Court's imposition of a
heightened burden of justification.'59 From this comparison
emerges the conclusion that it was unnecessary for the majority
to impose a heavier burden on the government to justify the
Honoraria Ban. Additionally, the dissent pointed out that the
Honoraria Ban exempted from its ban "travel and other expens-
es related to employee speech." 6 ° The dissent determined that
the burden imposed on the respondents in National Treasury
was only a limited, not significant, burden.'6'
According to the dissent, then, the proper application of the
Pickering test would require the government to reasonably show
that its "paramount interests in preventing impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety" outweighed the limited burden im-
posed on the respondents, thereby justifying the Honoraria
Ban. '6 Substantial weight should have been given to the
government's reasonable predictions of impropriety on the part
of its employees.' 6'
Interestingly, the dissent pointed out a similarity between
the Honoraria Ban and the Hatch Act which the majority had
failed to do:
155. Id. 115 S. Ct. at 1024 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1024, 1029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
157. Simon & Shuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105
(1991).
158. 115 S. Ct. at 1025 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
159. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1030 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
162. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1025 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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One of the purposes of the [Hatch] Act was assuredly to
free employees who did not wish to become engaged in
politics from requests by their superiors to contribute money
or time, but to the extent the Act protected these employees
it undoubtedly limited the First Amendment rights of those
who did wish to take an active part in politics.'
Upon disregarding the Hatch Act comparison, the majority
struck an unreasonable balance to conclude that the govern-
ment employees' interests outweighed that of the govern-
ment.'65 The dissent claimed that the majority ignored the
government's foremost interest in preventing impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety of its employees, and in achiev-
ing its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible.'66 The
dissent believed that Congress had reasonably struck a balance
in favor of the government's interests, thus precluding any
constitutional objection since, in Congress' judgment, "efficiency
may be best obtained by prohibiting" honoraria.'67
The dissent also claimed that the majority misappropriated
the burden on the government by focusing only on the burdens
of the Honoraria Ban to the four respondents in National Trea-
sury."'5 Although the respondents were all members of the
class of sub-GS-16 workers, the dissent suggested that they too
could generate impropriety or the appearance of impropri-
ety."'69 Thus, the majority's theory "that federal employees be-
low grade GS-16 have negligible power to confer favors" and to
give rise to perceived improprieties is "seriously flawed."7 °
This theory is inconsistent with the amount of deference usual-
164. Id. at 1029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The majority dismissed the Hatch
Act comparison presented by the government as irrelevant, because the Act aimed to
protect employees' First Amendment right to free expression, rather than to restrict
this right. See supra part IV.C.3.d.
165. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1026-27 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1026 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1027 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
169. I& at 1028 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[The majority] conclud[ed] that Con-
gress could not extend [the] presumption [of impropriety] to federal employees below
grade GS-16.").
170. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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ly given to "government predictions of harm used to justify
restriction of employee speech." 7'
Finally, the dissent commented on the majority's treatment of
the "nexus" requirement and stated that the majority's applica-
tion of the "nexus" to all employees under GS-16 was too
broad.'72 Because many express activities of these employees
are unrelated to their federal duties, the Honoraria Ban would
not apply.'73 Alternatively, the Honoraria Ban would apply to
"an unknown number of these individuals [who] would receive
honoraria where there is a nexus between their speech and
their Government employment."'74 The dissent further inter-
preted the statute's exemption for a "series of appearances,
speeches, or articles" as a demonstration of Congress's sensitivi-
ty to inhibiting as little speech as possible.'75 The majority
overlooked this dimension of the Honoraria Ban upon determin-
ing that the lack of a "nexus" requirement coupled with the
express exemption for a "series" of expressive activities under-
mined the across-the-board ban on honoraria. According to the
dissent, then, the majority should have formulated some type of
"nexus" requirement for those employees below the GS-16 level
so as to avoid the broad remedy the majority granted to the
whole class of employees.'76
The dissent relied upon established principles found in
Pickering and Waters to oppose the imposition of a heavier
burden of justification, and defended the Honoraria Ban of its
content neutrality. in contrast, the majority simultaneously
171. Id. at 1027 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
172. See generally id. at 1027-28 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority focuses on employees who are members of the class in question but by no
means breadth of the class as defined in 5 U.S.C. app. 505(3)).
173. See id. at 1027. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Congress' rationale
was interpreted by the dissent as follows:
One is far less likely to undertake a "series" of speeches or articles with-
out being paid than he is to make a single speech or write a single
article without being paid. Congress reasonably could have concluded that
the number of cases where an employee wished to deliver a "series" of
speeches would be much smaller than the number of requests to give
individual speeches or write individual articles.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 1029-31 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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drew an unprecedented distinction of an ex antelex post restric-
tion to evolve the classic Pickering test, and safe-guarded the
long established and guaranteed First Amendment right of
freedom of expression. The arguments presented by the dissent
are strong, and perhaps suggestive of a level of uncertainty as
to how to scrutinize congressional acts which allegedly interfere
with a public employee's First Amendment rights. The dissent's
arguments are of the recurring kind which will undoubtedly
appear in future courts' opinions of cases similar to National
Treasury.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
National Treasury illustrates an evolutionary scheme crafted
by the Supreme Court to appropriately apply the Pickering test
to unprecedented facts regarding the First Amendment rights of
public employees. The decision serves to guide courts to proper-
ly allocate to the government employer the burden of justifi-
cation of restricting expression. Not only does National Trea-
sury require that there be a heavier burden of justification on
the part of the government employer where there is an ex ante
restriction on expression, it also reaffirms the principle estab-
lished in Simon & Schuster which regards a financial burden
on expression as an abridgment of First Amendment rights.
In May of 1995, three months after the National Treasury
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that regulations'77 prohibiting govern-
ment employees from receiving compensation or reimbursement
for unofficial speaking or writing activities relating to their offi-
cial duties, while permitting such compensations for officially
authorized activities on the same issues, were unconstitution-
al.'78 The D.C. Court relied on the principles established in
177. 5 C.F.R. § 2636.202(b) (1992) [hereinafter OGE/EPA regulation] ("An employee
is prohibited by the standards of conduct from receiving compensation, including trav-
el expenses, for speaking or writing on subject matter that focuses specifically on his
official duties or on the responsibilities, policies and programs of his employing agen-
cy."). This regulation was adopted by the Office of Government Ethics ("OGE") in
January 1991 and distributed by the EPA to its employees. See Sanjour v. EPA, 984
F.2d 434, 436-37 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
178. Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995), rev'g 984 F.2d 434 (1993).
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the National Treasury decision to arrive at its conclusion in
Sanjour v. EPA.179 The court followed the analysis of the Na-
tional Treasury Court and applied the balancing test to the
competing government and employee interests.'
Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit court's approach to Sanjour
was different before National Treasury was decided, thus ren-
dering a different conclusion to the case. Upon addressing the
constitutionality of the OGE/EPA regulation in 1993, the court
did not find the regulation to impose a severe burden on the
employees' First Amendment rights.'' However, the 1993
Sanjour court based its decision on the distinction between the
meaning of "official" and "unofficial" speech," 2 whereas the
National Treasury Court made its basis on the definition of
honorarium. Although the OGE/EPA regulation in Sanjour does
not define "honorarium," it was adopted to interpret existing
ethics law on honoraria and finds its authority in the 1978
Act.1
This brief comparison of the two holdings in Sanjour displays
two different approaches that the D.C. Circuit Court took to
interpret the regulation on expressive activity before and after
the National Treasury decision was made. The holding in the
1995 Sanjour case clearly supports the contention that National
Treasury serves to guide courts to properly allocate to the gov-
ernment employer the burden of justification of restricting ex-
pression. This holding may also forecast a shift in judicial fa-
voritism from the government's interest in preventing impropri-
eties caused by accepting outside income to the public
179. Id. at 91 'Fortunately, the Supreme Court's recent decision in [National
Treasury] offers useful guidance on how to apply Pickering in such a case." Id.
180. Id. at 90-99.
181. 984 F.2d at 441.
182. 984 F.2d at 442. The court found the definition promulgated by the EPA to
be helpful:
Writing, speaking, or editing is normally "official" if it results from a re-
quest to EPA to furnish a speaker, author or editor. If an invitation is
addressed to an employee, the invitation is "official" if it is tendered
because of the employee's EPA position rather than the employee's indi-
vidual knowledge or accomplishments. The fact that an activity is pre-
pared for or performed outside normal duty hours is not controlling.
Otherwise, such activities are "outside" activities for purposes of § 3.500.
40 C.F.R. § 3.503 (1991).
183. See 5 C.F.R. § 2636.202 (1992).
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employee's interest in protecting his individual right to free
speech.
The legislative history of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 sug-
gests that both the Quadrennial Commission and the
President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform were
concerned mainly with imposing the Honoraria Ban on higher-
level employees within the federal government."M If this is in-
deed true, then the Court's holding in National Treasury is
justified. There is no reason that the Court should have limited
the holding as well as the remedy to only those parties to the
case. Upon determining that the application of the Honoraria
Ban abridged the First Amendment rights of the federal em-
ployees below GS-16, the Court, naturally, extended the remedy
to the entire class of employees below that level.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is important to recognize that the Court's holding in Na-
tional Treasury neither serves to take away from the govern-
ment employer its right to restrict the expressive activities of
its employees nor ignores the interests that the government
serves to advance and preserve in regulating such activity.
Rather, National Treasury suggests that as long as the govern-
ment employer is able to justify its restraints on expression in
a sufficient manner, and also demonstrate that its interests
clearly outweigh any burden imposed on its employees, then its
restraint will pass judicial scrutiny.
The manner in which the Court arrived at its decision in
National Treasury does not depart from the established princi-
ples of Pickering and its progeny. In fact, the Court consistently
adhered to principles established in cases involving First
Amendment rights of public employees, only modifying their
application as consistent with the facts in National Treasury.
The advancement or evolution of the Pickering test was the
judicial mechanism by which the Court adjudicated a unique,
yet recurrent, constitutional issue. Until the Court is able to
184. See Robert S. Collins, Ethics and the First Amendment: The Applicability of
the Honorarium Ban of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 to the Executive Branch, 62
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 888, 893 (1994).
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understand Congress' intent expressed by the wording of the
Honoraria Ban, it will have to evaluate the First Amendment
rights of public employees on a case-by-case basis.
The aftermath of National Treasury will test Congress. Per-
haps attempts such as those made in 1991 to loosen the prohi-
bition on honoraria may now succeed. 5' Perhaps Congress
will clarify its intent and rewrite the Honoraria Ban so that its
purpose can be served efficiently. It may be possible that Con-
gress will "sever" certain words and phrases from the Honoraria
Ban so as to strengthen its constitutional validity. National
Treasury clearly suggests that these are areas in which Con-
gress will need to focus. After all, these areas fall within the
legislative, not judicial, jurisdiction of the federal government.
Judy M. Lin
185. In 1991, the Senate and the House of Representatives were unable to agree
on which workers should be exempted from the honoraria ban. Susan B. Glasser,
Congress Set to Ban Senate Staff Honoraria; At the Same Time, a Bill to Relax a
Ban for All Government Workers Appears Stalled, ROLL CALL, July 25, 1991. Repre-
sentative Barney Frank (D-Mass) sponsored a bill to exclude those at or below the
GS-16 level. Id. House Judiciary Committee Chairman Jack Brooks (D-Texas), howev-
er, objected to the below GS-16 exclusion. Dana Priest Ethics Law's Deep Reach Into
Bureaucracy; Honoraria Ban Curtails Employees' Outside Work; Court Challenge Cites
First Amendment, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1991, at A19. Brooks suggested that an exclu-
sion be made for all those federal employees who made outside appearances unrelated
to their official work; that is, any federal employee should be allowed to accept hono-
raria so long as the speech, appearance, lecture, etc. is not related to their govern-
ment duties.
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